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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF
WILLS, ESTATES AND TRUSTS
By

WILLIAM P. CANTWELL*

Fewer cases involving new and unsettled problems in the probate and trust field reached the supreme court in 1961 than in the
last several years.
An exceptionally interesting and important case arose in the
1
inheritance tax area. People v. Bejarano
involved inheritance taxes
payable in the estate of a deceased employee of the Shell Chemical
Corporation. For a substantial portion of his employment and his
married life decedent had been domiciled in California, and for a
short time he had been domiciled in Texas. He died domiciled in
Colorado. At issue was the taxation of funds in a company-administered employees' trust. The widow contended that she owned a
vested interest consisting of one-half of the portion of the assets
acquired while she and the decedent had been domiciled in the two
community property jurisdictions of California and Texas. The commissioner contended that the full value of the decedent's interest
should be taxed as a transfer on the ground that there had been a
gift or grant intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
at or after the death of the decedent, within the meaning of Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 138-4-7 (1953). The supreme court determined that the
surviving widow had in fact acquired a vested interest unrelated
to decedent's death and that such interest would be recognized in
Colorado, so that only the portion of the assets not so vested in the
widow could be transferred by the decedent. While the case deals
only with the inheritance tax, it establishes an important precedent in an area which will probably grow in importance as the
population continues to move in and out of community property
states.
Two cases dealt again with the problems caused by dispositive
provisions in favor of a beneficiary "and his heirs," and in both
cases the words were held to be those of limitation
and not of sub-3
2
stitution. and purchase. In Estate of Newby and Estate of Hubbs
the court followed its earlier rulings 4 which established that the
words alone will be treated as words of limitation and that there
must be some other form of clearly demonstrated intent in the will
if any substitution is to occur.
Two cases demonstrated some of the pitfalls of managing businesses found among estate assets. United States v. Smith 5 involved
an intricate fact situation concerning a failing roofing business.
Decedent's administratrix early determined that the business
needed more funds. During the creditor period she obtained ex
parte authority to loan her own funds to the estate for continuation
Mr. Cantwell is a member of the Denver and Colorado Bar Associations and is a member of
the Denver firm of Holland & Hart.
1 358 P.2d 866 (Colo. 1961).
2 361 P.2d 622 (Colo. 1961).
3 365 P.2d 513 (Colo. 1961).
4 Feeney v. Mahoney, 121 Colo. 599, 221 P.2d 357 (1950); Conn v. Richards, 126 Colo. 54, 246
P.2d 906 (1952).
5 359 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1961).
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of the business. After some three years the business failed, and a
question of priority of claimants arose. The administratrix claimed
the loan from herself to the estate was, in substance, a necessary
expense of administration and that because of this it was a second
class claim. The claim was allowed and the United States appealed
since the classification was prejudicial to payment of its claims for
taxes, for unremitted withholding, and for damages for an allegedly
faulty or incomplete roofing job at a government installation. It
contended that the statute authorizing business continuation required notice before continuation and borrowing, and that any inherent authority in the county court to authorize an ex parte loan
for business continuation could be only for a short period, and not
for an extended administration. The supreme court rejected the
contention, and affirmed the classification of the amount of the
loan as an expense of administration. It pointed out that notice to
creditors who had not filed claims was impossible during the creditor period and that a hardship would be worked if proper steps
to conserve assets could not be taken during the creditor period. It
also noted that all creditors knew of the loan and that no objection
had been made during the period when the administratrix was making every effort to save the business.
Toplitzky v. Schilt6 involved problems faced by a successor
fiduciary in dealing with substantial amounts disbursed by' a predecessor administratrix who had conducted her deceased hfisband's
business. The issue that reached the supreme court was whether
the successor fiduciary had standing to object on the final report
proceeding. The administratrix contended that the successor fiduciary was not an aggrieved person. This issue was not squarely
decided, but the case was remanded after the trial court had ordered
a restoration of funds; the supreme court determining that the trial
court could do nothing more than to require the administratrix to
render a full, complete and correct account and report. It would
appear that a 1961 amendment, (H. B. 373), to Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 152-10-8 (1) (1953), has corrected the problem presented by the
case, but it nevertheless indicates that before this amendment a
real problem existed in situations in which a successor fiduciary
sought judgment against a predecessor by way of objections to a
final report.
Adoption matters also received attention in two cases. Wright
v. Wysowatcky7 might have been a landmark case had it not been
for a statutory amendment 8 of 1961 which has codified the result
the court reached on the facts before it. The sole issue was the right
of an adoptive parent to inherit from an intestate adopted child.
The court held that the parent could so inherit. The court referred
to the amendment, even though it did not control the case before it,
and pointed out that the legislature's action confirmed what the
court held to be the effect of the descent and distribution statute
prior to 1961. As a result of the case and the statute, an area of
previous ambiguity now appears to be well settled.
6361 P.2d 970 (Colo. 1961).
7 363 P.2d 1046 (Colo. 1961).
2RColo. Rev. Stat. § 152-2-4 (1953) as amended by Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 275, § 2.
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Pool v. Harold9 was the second adoption case. It involved the
perplexing problem of decretal provisions preventing the disinheritance of an adopted child. 10 The holding was that the provision
in the adoption decree could be enforced, and that the adoptive
father's violation of this undertaking, on which the decree was
based, could be prevented by impressing a trust on the estate assets.
The decision is consistent with prior holdings and serves again as a
warning to search the facts carefully, particularly if the adoption
antedatedthe passage of the current Colo. Rev. Stat. § 152-2-4 (1953)
in the year 1941, which barred such decretal provisions.
O'Brien v. Wallace"" involved a procedural issue in a will contest. The caveat had alleged improper execution as well as mental
incapacity. The proof of execution was regular and uncontested,
but the trial court submitted the issue of execution to the jury along
with the issue of capacity. Judgment entered on the jury's verdict
for the caveators was reversed and the case was remanded; the
supreme court held that a general verdict on distinct issues cannot
be sustained if one of the issues should never have been submitted
to the jury.
While other cases in the field reached the court, they dealt with
matters of narrower interest or matters falling into the pattern of
previous holdings.
9 367 P.2d 592 (Colo. 1961).
10 Cf. Quintrall v. Goldsmith,
Colo. 28, 273 Poc. 21 (1928).
11359 P.2d 1029 (Colo. 1961).

134 Colo. 410, 306 P.2d 246 (1957),

Dillingham v. Schmidt, 85

Trust The Moving and Storage Requirements
Of Yourself and Your ClientsTo Men Who Understand Your Problems.

CONFER WITH DON JOHNSON

JOHNSON STORAGE & MOVING CO.
Affiliated With United Van Lines

221
Broadway

Pearl

Local and World-wide

3-2433

